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Income-tax Department
Edited By Stephen G. Rusk
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
The 1918 act included in the gross estate subject to the estate tax an
irrevocable transfer in trust made in 1911, the grantor reserving the income
during her life, and congress had authority to so provide. (Cleveland Trust
Co., Executor v. Routzhan, Collector, in U. S. district court, N. D., Ohio.)
A corporation which sustained a net loss for a part of its fiscal year after
organization may deduct such loss in the succeeding taxable year under the
act of 1921. (U. S. A. v. Carroll Chain Co., U. S. district court, E. D., Ohio.)
Where suits are brought for the recovery of estate taxes paid, the district
court has jurisdiction to try the question of tax liability de novo, without being
limited to the evidence heard by the commissioner and prejudiced by his
action.
Insurance policies on the life of decedent which have been assigned by him
prior to the passage of the 1918 act should not be included in the gross estate
subject to the estate tax.
Property transferred to a trustee over ten years before the grantor’s death,
the principal to be paid to the beneficiaries at a specified date, the income in the
meantime to be paid the grantor for distribution among said beneficiaries,
should not be included in the gross estate, especially where over five years
prior to his death, he divested himself of such right of distribution.
Property transferred in trust over five years prior to grantor’s death, in ac
cordance with a long existing plan, should not be included in his gross estate
subject to the estate tax, especially when the transfer was made before there
was any such tax. (Fidelity & Columbia Trust Company, Executor, v. Lucas,
Collector, U. S. district court, W. D., Kentucky.)
Claims for United States income taxes against a corporation may be pre
sented at any time during the pendency of state receivership proceedings and
before the assets are distributed, although the state court has limited the time
within which claims may be filed, and the court may not require the Govern
ment to compromise. (Reinecke, Collector v. General Combustion Company,
appellate court Illinois, first district.)
Invested capital under section 326 of the 1918 act may not include so called
earned surplus until an operating deficit of the corporation has been made up.
(Milton Dairy Company v. Willcuts, Collector, district court, district of
Minnesota, third division.)
A distribution by a corporate dividend occurs when declared, and not when
paid and dividends declared January 24, 1917, and prior thereto, could not
have been from “accumulated undivided profits or surplus” of that year and
must be taxed to the stockholder at the 1916 rates under section 31 of the act of
1916 (added by the act of 1917), although received as late as July 2, 1927.
(F. H. Mason v. C. F. Routzahn, district court, Ohio, N. D., E. D.)

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3735. July 30, 1925)
Article 517: Religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educational organi
zations and community chests.
Exemption of religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educa
tional organizations and community chests.—Article 517 of regula
tions 65 amended.
Article 517 of regulations No. 65 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 517. Religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educational organi
zations and community chests.—In order to be exempt under paragraph (6)
of section 231, the organization must meet two tests: (1) It must be organized
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and operated exclusively for one or more of the specified purposes; and (2)
its net income must not inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private
shareholders or individuals.
Corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes
comprise, in general, organizations for the relief of the poor. The fact that
a corporation established for the relief of indigent persons may receive volun
tary contributions from the persons intended to be relieved will not necessarily
deprive it of exemption.
An association whose sole purpose is the instruction of the public, or an
association whose primary purpose is to give lectures on subjects useful to
the individual and beneficial to the community, may be exempt as an educa
tional corporation, even though such an association has incidental amusement
features. Associations formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propa
ganda are not educational within the meaning of the statute.
Since a corporation to be exempt under paragraph (6) of section 231 must
be organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the specified pur
poses, an organization which has certain religious purposes, for example, and
which also manufactures and sells articles to the public for profit is not exempt
even though its property is held in common and its profits do not inure to the
benefit of individual members of the organization.
The words “private shareholder or individual” in the act refer to in
dividuals having a personal and private interest in the activities of the
corporation.
(T. D. 3741. August 10, 1925)
Section 402(c), Regulations 37, Article 24; Regulations 63, Article 20:
Reservation of income.
Estate Tax—Revenue Act of 1918—Decision of Court
1. Gross Estate—Transfers—Trusts Intended to Take Effect
at Death.
Where a donor creates a trust reserving the right to the income
for life, with power in the trustee to draw at its discretion on the
principal for her support and maintenance, the value of the property
transferred was properly included in decedent’s gross estate under
the provisions of section 402 of the revenue act of 1918.
2. Estate Tax—Constitutionality—Retroactivity.
The estate tax levied by the revenue act of 1918 is not a direct
tax and the inclusion in decedent’s gross estate of property trans
ferred prior to the passage of the act, although vesting in bene
ficiaries, is constitutional, as the provisions of the act are retroac
tive in effect.
3. Decision Followed.
The decision of the United States circuit court of appeals for
the sixth circuit (269 Fed., 321, T. D. 3119) followed.
The following decision of the United States district court for the northern
district of Ohio, in the case of Cleveland Trust Co., Executor of McBride, v.
Routzahn, Collector, is published for the information of internal-revenue officers
and others concerned.

District Court of

the

United States, Northern District of Ohio
Eastern Division

The Cleveland Trust Co., Executor of the Estate of Harriet E. McBride, plaintiff,
v. C. F. Routzahn, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant.
[July 1, 1925]
Westenhaver, district judge: Defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s petition
raises the question of the liability of the estate of Harriet E. McBride under
the revenue act of 1918 for the transfer or inheritance tax upon certain prop
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erty transferred or conveyed by her in trust prior to the passage of said act
On September 30, 1911, Harriet E. McBride executed and delivered to the
Cleveland Trust Co. a certain trust agreement conveying and assigning to the
trustee certain real estate, shares of stocks, bonds, and other property, which
was to be held, managed, and controlled by the trustee with full power of sale
and reinvestment. The income derived therefrom was to be paid to Harriet
E. McBride during her life, with power in the trustee to draw at its discre
tion on the principal for her support and maintenance. The beneficiaries took
thereunder a vested estate not revocable by the donor nor subject to any con
tingency except the reserved right to make use of the principal. Harriet E.
McBride died intestate September 11,1920. Her remaining estate was devised
and bequeathed by her to persons other than the beneficiaries of this trust
agreement. The value of the property transferred in trust was included as a
part of her estate subject to the transfer or inheritance tax and was paid by
the plaintiff, her executor, from the residue of the estate. This action is to
recover back that tax paid under protest. All jurisdictional requirements have
been satisfied.
Whether the property conveyed in trust was properly included and the tax
paid lawfully assessed and collected turns on the proper construction of sec
tions 401 and 402 of the revenue act of 1918, enacted February 24, 1919.
Plaintiff’s counsel does not seriously challenge the proposition that section
402(c) intended that this property should be included. The contention, rather,
is that congress did so intend but that the retroactive provisions of said section
are in violation of the provisions of the United States constitution. The
language of the section requires to be included any interest of “which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has at
any time created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death; whether such transfer or trust
is made or created before or after the passage of this act.” Bona fide sales
for fair consideration in money or money’s worth are excepted. The section
further provides that any transfer in the nature of a final disposition or dis
tribution, made by the decedent within two years prior to his death without
such consideration, shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been
made in contemplation of death.
This language, in my opinion, covers the facts of this case. It is not sus
ceptible of a prospective construction, i. e., applicable only to trusts created
after the statute was enacted. The legal question is therefore, in my opinion,
correctly apprehended by plaintiff’s counsel.
The argument seems, in substance, to be aside. The tax as applied to the
facts of this case is not a tax upon a transfer of property or upon the trans
mission of property or a tax incident to succession by death, the amount of
which tax is to be measured by the value of certain property. On the contrary,
it is urged that the tax is a direct property tax upon property owned and
acquired by the beneficiaries under the trust prior to the enactment of the
law, and is unconstitutional because not apportioned as is required by the
United States constitution. Many weighty reasons are urged in support of
this contention. Counsel for the plaintiff and defendant have reviewed fully
all the decisions of the United States supreme court and of state courts of
last resort and of inferior federal courts. Due consideration has been given
thereto, but I deem it unnecessary to go over the ground fully in this opinion,
for the reason that I am convinced the questions relied on by plaintiff are
ruled adversely to its contention by the decision of the sixth circuit court
of appeals in Shwab v. Doyle (6th C. C. A., 269, Fed., 321 (T. D. 3119)), by
which this court is bound.
Shwab v. Doyle arose under the revenue act of 1916. The property has
been transferred in trust prior to its enactment, and the donor’s death had
taken place after it went into effect. It was held that the corresponding pro
visions of the revenue act of 1916 included transactions taking place before
its passage and that the act was not subject to any constitutional infirmity
by reason thereof. In substance, the considerations now urged against the con
stitutionality of the revenue act of 1918 were urged then and duly considered
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and held ineffective. Upon review, the United States supreme court [T. D.
3339, C. B. 1-2, 312] differed only from the circuit court of appeals in that it
was held the provisions of the revenue act of 1916 were not intended to be
retroactive but to apply only to transactions taking place after it was passed.
In no other respect was the reasoning of the court below disapproved. Inas
much as the revenue act of 1918 has inserted apt language, showing conclu
sively the intention that its provisions should apply retroactively to transac
tions taking place before its passage, the decision of the sixth circuit court
remains the law within this jurisdiction and must be applied by me.
This conclusion disposes of the case, but a few observations may be made
with respect to later decisions of inferior federal courts in cases arising under
the revenue act of 1918. These decisions are in conflict. In Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Tait (295 Fed., 429 (T. D. 3544) [C. B. III-1, 470]) district judge
Soper followed and applied Shwab v. Doyle to a case arising under the revenue
act of 1918 in which the facts are indistinguishable from the facts of this case.
In Shukert v. Allen (300 Fed., 754 (T. D. 3614) [C. B. III-2, 377]) district
judge Woodrough held the revenue act of 1918 applicable to a transfer in
trust made prior to its passage and that the act so construed was not subject
to any constitutional infirmity. I am advised that Judge Woodrough’s judg
ment was affirmed by the eighth circuit court of appeals May 16, 1925 [T. D.
3729, Bulletin IV-30, 9], but the opinion has not yet appeared in the Federal
Reporter and no copy thereof has been furnished to me. Mercantile Trust
Co. v. Hellmich (T. D. 3545) [C. B. III—1, 473]) is cited to the same effect, but
no copy of the opinion has been furnished.
Opposing, is cited and relied on by plaintiff Frick v. Lewellyn (298 Fed., 803),
decided by district judge Thompson, in which it is held the provisions of the
revenue act of 1918 are retroactive as applied to moneys derived by benefi
ciaries in insurance policies, but that so construed the act is unconstitutional.
On review, the United States supreme court, May 11, 1925 [T. D. 3715, Bul
letin IV-24, 6], affirmed this judgment, holding that section 402 (f) of the act
was to be construed prospectively and not include the avails of insurance poli
cies taken out in the name of beneficiaries prior to its passage. This holding
was made on authority of Shwab v. Doyle (258 U. S., 529 (T. D. 3339) [C. B.
I-2, 312]) and the difference in language between 402 (c), pertaining to trans
fers of property in trust, and 402 (b), pertaining to insurance policies is so
different as plainly to require this conclusion. In addition it may be said that
the avails of life insurance policies never were a property interest in the in
sured in the sense that section 402 (c) is applied to property in which the donor
once had an interest and had made a transfer or created a trust in contempla
tion of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death.
In this respect the cases are distinguishable upon the facts. Coolidge v.
Nichols (4 F (2) 112), decision by Brewster, district judge, January 28, 1925,
is also cited and relied on by plaintiff’s counsel. The reasoning of the judge
supports plaintiff’s contention but the facts are not parallel. The property
was transferred to a trustee with the income during life reserved to the donor
and the principal payable to certain beneficiaries at or after death. Prior to
the passage of the revenue act of 1918 the donor and life beneficiary had
transferred all interest therein to the remaindermen. The death of the life
tenant did not take place until more than two years had elapsed after the last
transfer, so that the transaction was not one presumptively made in contem
plation of death and could be brought within the statute only by affirmative
proof that it was made in contemplation of death. After the life beneficiary
had transferred her interest to the remaindermen a naked or dry trust was
left in the trustee. It seems to me that whatever may have been the nature of
the transfer when the trust was first created it had ceased to be a trust created
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the donor
when the donor relinquished her remaining interest, and that it took effect in
possession and enjoyment at that time and not at or after death. The case
might well have been disposed of, it seems to me, on this view.
Girard Trust Co. v. McCaughn (3 F (2) 618), decided by district judge
Dickinson December, 1924, is also cited and relied on. Upon the facts it is in
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point and the judgment rendered is in conflict with the conclusion to which
I have come. Judge Dickinson does not hold that the retroactive provisions
of section 402(c) are unconstitutional but does construe its provisions as inap
plicable to a trust created before the act was passed, under which transfer the
beneficiaries acquired a vested estate in remainder. In that situation he is of
opinion that the trust takes effect in possession or enjoyment at the time the
estate in remainder is vested in law, and not at the time the estate therein of
the life tenant terminates and the physical possession and beneficial enjoyment
is cast upon the remainderman. This construction of the statute has not been
insisted on by plaintiff’s counsel, and it does not seem to me to be tenable.
The foregoing are all the cases to which my attention has been called, and
I am of opinion that plaintiff’s counsel have correctly apprehended the ultimate
question of law upon which this controversy turns. Plaintiff is entitled to
relief only upon the view that the tax is not in substance an indirect or excise
tax upon either the right to transmit or the right to succeed to property but is
in substance and effect a direct tax upon the property transferred and is there
fore invalid because not apportioned, or is such an arbitrary exaction as to be
in excess of the power conferred upon congress by the constitution. I am not
able to assent to any of these views because of the binding decision of the
circuit court of appeals of this circuit to the contrary in Shwab v. Doyle, the
authority of which in this forum remains unimpaired.
Defendant’s demurrer will be sustained. If plaintiff elects to stand upon its
petition as framed, final judgment will be entered.
(T. D. 3742. August 12, 1925)
Article 1381: Interest on judgments.
Practice and Procedure—Decision of Court
1. Actions—Judgments—Interest—Internal Revenue Taxes.
A collector of internal revenue is not liable in an action of assumpsit
for additional interest claimed to be due on a judgment recovered
against him where certificate of probable cause under section 989,
Revised Statutes, has issued and the principal amount of the judgment
with interest to date of final judgment has been paid.
2. Same.
Interest, in internal-revenue tax cases, runs to the date of final
judgment and not to the date of payment of the judgment.
The following decision of the United States district court for the northern
district of Ohio, in the case of White v. Weiss, collector, is published for the
information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
United States for the Northern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division
John G. White, plaintiff, v. Harry H. Weiss, collector of internal revenue,
defendant
[July 3, 1925]
Westenhaver, Judge: Plaintiff has filed herein, on March 6, 1925, a motion
for further relief in collection of an alleged balance unpaid on judgment here
tofore rendered. The action originally was one to recover back income tax,
paid under protest, alleged to have been unlawfully assessed. On March 31,
1922, judgment was rendered in plaintiff’s favor for $8,126.43, which sum in
cluded interest previously accruing on the payments as made. A certificate of
probable cause was applied for and issued at the time this judgment was ren
dered. An appeal was prosecuted to the circuit court of appeals, resulting in
an affirmance; and on a writ of certiorari the United States supreme court
took jurisdiction and affirmed the judgment of the lower courts. See Wise v.
Stearns (265 U. S., 242; T. D. 3609 [C. B. III—251]). Upon coming down of
the mandate, judgment was entered thereon in this court for said sum of
$8,126.43, and the costs in all courts, to draw interest at the rate of 6 per cent
per annum from the 7th day of February, 1922, the date of the entry of the

District Court

of the
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original judgment, until paid. A further certificate of probable cause was
applied for and issued at the time of entering the judgment.
Upon application made in conformity to the regulations of the treasury de
partment and the commissioner of internal revenue, the judgment and costs
as entered, with interest to July 14, 1924, was paid. It is plaintiff’s contention
that he was entitled to interest until date of payment. It is the contention
of the district attorney and solicitor for the commissioner of internal revenue,
conducting the defense, that plaintiff is not entitled to interest except to July
14, 1924, the date of the final judgment, which, it is said, accords with the
rule settled and established in Shell v. Cochran (107 U. S., 625).
Plaintiff by his motion asks, first, an order requiring the proper officials of
the United States treasury to allow and pay the sum of $307.44, the amount
of interest accruing from July 14, 1924, to March 3, 1925; or, second, in the
alternative, that execution be awarded against the defendant personally for
said unpaid interest. Elaborate briefs have been filed. Due consideration has
been given to the arguments advanced and to the authorities cited. My con
clusions will be stated for information of counsel, without elaboration.
Obviously, the first branch of the motion is not within the jurisdiction of
this court. The officials against whom the order is asked are not parties to
this case and are not within the reach of its process. The relief sought by
the second branch of the motion is expressly prohibited by statute. See Re
vised Statutes, section 989; U. S. Comp. Stats., 1916, section 635. After judg
ment rendered against a collector, as was defendant, for recovery of money
exacted by or paid to him, and by him paid into the treasury in performance
of his official duty, the court may certify that there was probable cause for
the act done by the collector or other officer, or that he acted under the di
rections of the secretary of the treasury or other proper officer of the gov
ernment. When this certificate is applied for and made, the statute forbids
the issue of execution on the judgment against the collector, and requires the
amount so recovered to be paid out of the proper appropriation from the
treasury. This section is in that chapter of the Revised Statutes regulating
execution upon judgments. The authorities seem to be uniform that no execu
tion may issue after this certificate is allowed. See Smietanka v. Indiana
Steel Co. (257 U. S., 1, 5 [Ct. D. 17, C. B. 5, 251]); Sage v. United States (250
U. S., 33, 37); Shell v. Cochran (107 U. S., 625); United States v. Sherman (98
U. S., 565); White v. Arthur (10 Fed., 80, 83); Nichols v. Gaston (1st C. C. A.)
(281 Fed., 67, 70).
The constitutional powers of congress so to provide in matters pertaining
to official acts under color of authority, particularly in matters pertaining to
the collection and disbursement of taxes and revenue, do not seem to me
to be open to question. It rests upon the same basis as the right of congress to
prohibit an action against a collector in such matters until after application
has been made to the commissioner of internal revenue for a refund of the
money so collected, or its power to prohibit the granting of an injunction to
restrain the collection of a tax unlawfully levied or assessed and remitting
the taxpayer to an action at law to recover the same back after having first
applied in the prescribed manner for a refund. The law in this respect appears
also to be beyond dispute. In addition to the cases above cited, see Cary v.
Curtis (3 How., 236); Curtis v. Fielder (2 Black, 461, 479); Collector v. Hubbard
(12 Wall., 1).
These views require a denial of plaintiff’s application in its entirety. Any
opinion expressed as to plaintiff’s right to interest between date of final judg
ment and actual payment can be only a dictum, but I deem it my duty to add
that settlement was made with the plaintiff in accordance with what appears
to be the settled practice of the accounting and disbursing officers of theUnited
States, and in accordance with what seems to be the settled law. See United
States v. Sherman (98 U. S., 567, 568); Shell v. Cochran (107 U. S., 625);
White v. Arthur (10 Fed., 80, 83); Angarica v. Bayard (127 U. S., 251, 260);
United States v. North Carolina (136 U. S., 211, 216).
Plaintiff’s motion will be denied. An exception may be noted.
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